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Introduction 
 
In 2014, a major development in the history of European integration took place with 
the start of supranational banking supervision through the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). The creation of the SSM was the first step in the construction of 
Banking Union.2  It was initially proposed in June 2012 by the European Council 
president (Van Rompuy 2012) and shortly thereafter endorsed by the European 
Council. The SSM is to be one of four Banking Union components also including: a 
single rulebook of EU bank regulation; a single framework for the managed resolution 
of banks and financial institutions; and a common backstop for temporary financial 
support. The creation of the SSM amounted to a radical initiative to rebuild financial 
market confidence in both banks and sovereigns – especially in the euro area periphery 
– to stabilise the national banking systems exposed directly to a vicious circle between 
the international financial crisis and the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis and to reverse 
the fragmentation of European financial markets (see Howarth and Quaglia 2013).  
 
The European Council agreed to the SSM Regulation in December 2012 which 
represents a compromise that assigned the European Central Bank (ECB) responsibility 
‘for the overall effective functioning of the SSM’ and ‘direct oversight of the euro area 
banks’ (European Council 2012: 2). This supervision however would be ‘differentiated’ 
and the ECB would carry it out in ‘close cooperation with national supervisory 
authorities’. Direct ECB supervision (through Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs)) was to 
cover those banks with assets exceeding €30 billion or those whose assets represent at 
least 20 per cent of their home country’s annual GDP. On 4 February 2014, the ECB 
(2014a) published a list of 128 such banks. 
 
In 2014, five important SSM milestones were reached. First, on 11 March, the ECB 
published its manual for its Asset Quality Review (AQR) (ECB 2014b). Second, on 16 
April, the ECB published its framework regulation for the operation of the SSM (ECB 
2014d), putting meat on the bones of the SSM Regulation adopted by Member States 
in the Council in 2013. Third, in September, the ECB endorsed the SSM Supervisory 																																																								
1 David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia would like to thank the Luxembourg Fondation 
Nationale de Recherche which funded Quaglia’s stay in Luxembourg during the 2014-
15 academic year and work on this contribution. 
2 The design of the SSM has been subject to legal analysis: notably, Alexander 2015; 
Ferran and Babis 2015. 
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Manual and published a Guide to Banking Supervision which had been drawn up by 
the Work Stream of the ECB Task Force consisting of ECB and experts from National 
Competent Authorities (NCAs3) of the SSM. Fourth, on 26 October the ECB published 
its Comprehensive Assessment of the 128 banks subject to its direct supervision. This 
Comprehensive Assessment consisted of the ECB’s own Asset Quality Review (AQR) 
of 128 euro area banks and of the European Banking Authority’s (EBA’s) Stress Tests 
of 123 banks in twenty-two European Economic Area (EEA) states. Fifth, the SSM 
officially began operation on 4 November, the date on which the ECB assumed full 
control of the prudential supervision of 128 euro area banks. 
 
This contribution focuses on the essential matter of the SSM’s credibility — in terms 
of its institutional and operational design and its first assessment of the stability of 
systemically important (significant) European banks. What added value does the SSM 
provide over national supervision? Officially, the SSM is supposed to ensure the more 
effective supervision of all euro area headquartered banks and notably those institutions 
subject to the direct ECB supervision because they meet the criteria set by the ECB to 
be classified as systemically important. The creation of the SSM was also part of a 
Banking Union package that includes fiscal support for banks deemed to be solvent and 
a supranational resolution mechanism for those not. Banking Union was designed to 
help tackle the sovereign debt crisis by addressing the sovereign debt bank doom loop 
that affected the euro periphery Member States. Thus, the broader effectiveness of the 
SSM — both in terms of good supervision and broader financial stability — can only 
be judged in the future and hinges on a number of factors, some of which have little to 
do with the design and operation of the SSM itself.  
 
This contribution seeks to answer a more modest but nonetheless essential question: 
does the institutional design of the SSM and its first assessment of systemically 
important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking supervision in 
Europe? One crucial measure of credibility with regard to the SSM and NCA 
supervision of less significant banks — the large majority of euro area headquartered 
bank not subject to direct ECB supervision — is the assurance of consistent supervision 
in the euro area. This involves some degree of convergence of NCA supervision in 
order to prevent national supervisory forebearance of struggling banks. It therefore 
becomes necessary to examine whether or not the design of the SSM provides the 
foundation to build convergence in euro area supervision of less significant banks, 
despite very different national supervisory practices and institutional frameworks. The 
first section below assesses the credibility of the SSM design in terms of providing the 
foundation for consistent supervision with the help of the Principal-Agent approach.  
 
The second section of this contribution examines the credibility of the ECB’s direct 
supervision of significant banks. The management of the ECB’s Comprehensive 
Assessment of signficant banks can be seen as the first step in demonstrating the 
capacity of the ECB to make difficult decisions with regard to the stability of the euro 
area’s banks. Other measures by which to judge the credibility of the SSM are difficult 																																																								
3 ‘National Competent Authorities’ (the NCAs) is a term used in the supervisory acquis 
to refer to national authorities responsible for banking (depending on given bank 
supervision arrangements at the national level in different EU Member States). For an 
overview of (pre-crisis) EU national supervisory architectures see, for example, 
Masciandaro, (2004), Masciandaro and Pellegrina (2008). 
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to evaluate. The quality of the supervisory process agreed in the SSM’s Supervisory 
Manual remains largely unknown. Ultimately, avoiding bank failure may be the best 
gauge of SSM credibility (as in Barth et al. 2006). However, bank resolution through 
the SRM rather than bank bail-out with either national or European funds might lend 
more credibility to the SSM. Many expert observers want banks in Europe to be 
resolved as frequently and unproblematically as in the United States (see Goldstein and 
Veron 2011). These are measures to debate in the context of future evaluations of the 
SSM.  This contribution seeks to determine if the SSM has begun the unprecedented 
adventure of supranational banking supervision on the right foot. 
 
Credibility of Institutional Design: ensuring the consistent supervision of less 
significant banks 
 
A significant part of the credibility of the SSM’s institutional design has been about 
designing ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ controls by the Single Supervisory Board (SSB) of 
the ECB over the NCAs in order to ensure a degree of consistency in supervisory 
practice. These controls can be understood through an application of the Principal-
Agent analytical framework (Weingast and Moran 1983, Kiewiet and McCubbins 
1991, Pollack 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 5). The ECB can be seen as a 
principal that adopts a range of controls to ensure that its policy preferences are 
enforced by the NCAs within the SSM. It then becomes important to assess whether 
these controls cover all of ‘zones of discretion’ 4  the NCAs have with regard to 
supervisory tasks5 which they carry out on the ECB’s behalf. The credibility of the SSM 
design thus depends upon limiting the NCAs’ ‘zone of discretion’ (what we refer to as 
‘black holes’). Clearly, in relation to the existing application of the Principal-Agent 
framework in national or European Union contexts, it is unusual to treat the non-
majoritarian, but independent, ECB as a principal and the non-majoritarian national 
supervisors (NCAs), selected by national governments, as agents of the ECB. In the 
vast majority of political science studies, a government or governments are treated as 
the principal / collective principal. With regard to EU policy making, Principal-Agent 
analysis has been applied to improve our understanding of the relations between EU 
Member States and the Commission and the ability of the former to control the latter 
(Pollack 1997); it has also been applied to examine the relations between the Member 
States and the European Central Bank, with the focus on the limited ex ante and ex post 
controls of the principals over the ECB agent (Elgie 2002). The Principal-Agent 
approach has also been used to explain the relations between EU Member States and 
the Council of Ministers (Ecofin) and notably in the area of the EU fiscal governance 
(Schuknecht 2004; Hodson 2009). However, to date, the application of Principal-Agent 
analysis to the relations between EU institutions and other agencies / authorities has 																																																								
4  To define a ‘zone of discretion’ this contribution employs the understanding 
developed by Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002). The zone of discretion is ‘the sum of 
delegated powers (policy discretion) granted by the principal to the agent, minus (b) the 
sum of control instruments, available for use by the principals to shape (constrain) or 
annul (reverse) policy outcomes that emerge as a result of the agent’s performance of 
set tasks’ (ibid: 5). 
5 For the sake of brevity, ‘supervisory tasks’ are understood in this contribution as 
specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions in accordance with the SSM Regulation (Council 2013). 
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been limited (see, for example, Thatcher 2011; and Eneberg and Trondal 2011). On the 
application of a Principal-Agent analysis to the relations between two non-majoritarian 
institutions / bodies see Waterman and Meier (1998) and Terman (2015). 
 
At the national level, with regard to banking supervision, Principal-Agent analysis has 
been conducted by a number of scholars to explore the incentive problems of bank 
supervisors acting as agents of national taxpayers (see, for example, Schuler 2003) and 
to examine the financing of bank supervision where society acts as the principal and 
the banking supervisory authority as the agent (Masciandaro et al. 2007). Principal-
Agent analysis has also been applied to explain policymakers’ decisions on the 
institutional design of bank supervision (in a comparative context see Masciandaro 
2004) and to understand the extent to which power is consolidated in financial 
supervision (Masciandaro and Pellegrina 2008).  
 
In the context of the SSM, three potential principal-agent relationships arise:  between 
Member State governments (collectively) and the ECB (and its Single Supervisory 
Board (SSB)); between Member State governments (individually) and NCAs;6 and 
between the ECB and NCAs. It is the latter on which we focus here given that the 
independence of both the ECB/SSB and NCAs is a starting point of the SSM — 
although it is very likely that NCA autonomy from Member State governments in the 
years to come will be tested especially when politically difficult decisions over bank 
mergers and resolution arise. While EU Member States assigned powers to the ECB 
over supervision in the context of the SSM regulation, they imposed no specific 
institutional framework to govern the relationship of the ECB and NCAs. Therefore, 
the ECB had a very large margin of manoeuvre in designing this framework. The focus 
of this section is on the likelihood of the SSM design resulting in consistency in 
supervision and thus most relevant is the principal-agent relationship between the ECB 
and the NCAs which carry out certain supervisory tasks on behalf of the ECB. As the 
ECB is solely responsible for the efficient functioning of the SSM, its relations with the 
NCAs are pivotal, in particular with regard to ensuring the ECB’s supervisory policy 
preferences within the system. 
 
The basic design of the SSM is outlined in its founding act:  the SSM Regulation 
(Council 2013). In light of this regulation, the SSM is a primarily7 euro area banking 
supervisory system (regime) consisting of the ECB and NCAs (of euro area Member 
States) as bank supervisors (Council 2013, article 6.1). The overarching objective of 
the SSM, for which the ECB is solely responsible (ibid.), is to ensure that all banks of 
the Member States participating in the system are subjected to supervision of the 
highest quality implemented in a coherent and effective manner (Council 2013, recital 
12). The SSM Regulation provides for two supervisory procedures relating to the euro 																																																								
6 The SSM Regulation provides no legal underpinning for the delegation of powers to 
the NCAs. Therefore, in the context of the operation of the SSM, the relationship 
between Member State governments and the NCAs has no direct legal basis per se. 
Nonetheless, NCAs remain agents of Member State governments in that they are 
appointed by them and, in terms of national politics, they remain de facto accountable 
to them with regard to their supervisory activities. 
7 The SSM Regulation provides the possibility for non-euro area Member States to opt-
in to a framework of ‘close cooperation’. The modalities of the ‘close cooperation’ 
regime are detailed in Part IX of the SSM Framework Regulation (ECB 2014d). 
	 5	
area banks in the SSM framework: the direct ECB’s supervision of the significant banks 
(Council 2013, article 6.4) and the direct NCAs’ supervision of the less significant 
banks (Council 2013, article 6.5) under the ECB’s oversight (indirect ECB 
supervision). Delegation of supervisory tasks with regard to less significant banks 
applies to the relationship between the ECB and the NCAs in a following way:8 as the 
ECB is solely responsible for effective and consistent functioning of the SSM, all the 
supervisory tasks carried out within the SSM are ones carried out on the account and 
on behalf of the ECB. Thus, it follows that all the supervisory tasks, notably supervision 
of less significant banks, are executed by the NCAs in the SSM on behalf of the ECB. 
 
From a rationalist perspective, the ECB’s core underlying interest is to ensure its control 
over supervision. From this stems a second interest:  to ensure effective supervision — 
although the measurement of this is potentially difficult as noted above. From these 
interests stem the preference of consistent, and thus largely convergent, supervision. 
Many EU Member State governments accepted the legitimacy of these interests and 
preference because they accepted, at least in part, the argument that the financial crisis 
in the EU was exacerbated by the fragmentation in the supervision of large cross-border 
banks — in addition to ineffective ‘light touch’ regulation and supervision in some 
Member States — and national supervisory bias — and notably the tendency to 
demonstrate ‘forbearance’ towards ‘national champions’.9 If we are to interpret the 
foundation of the SSM as a decisive EU post-crisis measure, this suggests that the 
ECB’s interest in the SSM framework should be to mitigate the factors which 
contributed to the impact of the recent financial crisis in the EU and to ensure the 
highest quality supervision. This interest — like that of ensuring ECB control — results 
in the preferences of reducing the scope of national supervisory divergence and 
eradicating the remaining national bias amongst NCAs. 
 
The ECB’s mechanisms of control over the NCAs  
Even when the principal’s policy preferences are clearly articulated, an agent should be 
seen as rational and opportunistic and capable of developing its own preferences (Ross 
1973; Kiewet, McCubbins 1991). The inherently asymmetrical distribution of 
information in a principal-agent relation favours the agent and creates perverse 
incentives for the agent to pursue its own preferences (Holmstrom 1979, Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991). In cases where agent preferences diverge from those of the principal, 
‘agency loss’ occurs and an agent ‘shirks’. The potential for agent ‘slippage’ — 
deliberate ‘shirking’ — can be created by the very structure of political delegation 
(Pollack 1997). Therefore, the principal must find ways to limit potential ‘shirking’ by 																																																								
8 The case of the SSM is a rare one where a political delegation is not formally followed 
by a legal delegation of tasks. In legal terms, no delegation between the ECB and the 
NCAs de jure occurs and the SSM is treated as ‘separate business line’ of the ECB with 
two different supervisory approaches:  a direct one to significant banks and indirect one 
to less significant banks. Yet this lack of legal delegation remains controversial both in 
policy making circles and in the legal academic community. See, for example, the 
analysis of Ferranini and Chiarella (2013) who describe the ECB-NCAs relations in 
terms of delegation, and Wymeersch (2014) who does not accept that delegation has 
occurred.  
9 For example, the Bundesbank in its October Monthly Report (2014: 44) argued that 
the SSM ‘will minimise the hazards of potentially inappropriate supervisory 
forbearance guided by national interests (known as “home bias”)’. 
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developing controls that encourage agent compliance with the principal’s policy 
choices and discourage the creation of incentives for the agent to ‘slip’. 
 
The principal-agent relationship between the ECB and the NCAs in the SSM relating 
to supervision of less significant banks is likely to contribute to NCA slippage, because 
the SSM Regulation confers on the ECB only the responsibility for its efficient and 
consistent functioning. ECB-NCA relations are principally designed as ‘relations of 
information’ (ECB 2014c) (in the words of the SSM Framework Regulation makers10). 
The principal focus of the ECB is upon significant banks (ECB 2015). 11  The 
interpretation of necessary consistency and degree of convergence in the supervision of 
less significant banks remains subject to different views amongst supervisors 
themselves. The former head of BAFIN, the German federal banking supervisor, Elke 
Koenig (who was subsequently appointed to Chair the Single Resolution Board based 
in Frankfurt) has repeatedly made clear her view that divergence in the supervision of 
less significant banks at the national level will continue in the immediate future given 
very different national institutional and regulatory frameworks — although she noted 
that harmonization would take place gradually and in the long term. In a clear assertion 
of ongoing NCA autonomy, Koenig even stated that the ECB’s specific decisions on 
the supervision of less significant banks would not be binding upon NCAs (Koenig 
2014). 
 
Principal-Agent analysis outlines two groups of mechanisms adopted to mitigate the 
agent ‘shirking’ and ensure agent alignment with the principal’s policy preferences. 
These are the ‘ex-ante’ and the ‘ex-post’ controls. As these controls are not costless 
measures their usage is ultimately a trade-off between higher agency costs and limiting 
of the ‘agency loss’. Here we examine the ‘ex ante’ and the ‘ex post’ controls assigned 
to the ECB in relation to NCA supervision of less significant banks within the SSM 
framework and their likely effectiveness. 
 
The principal’s ‘ex-ante’ controls, also known as administrative procedures, define the 
scope of agency, legal instruments available for the agent and the set of procedures the 
agent must follow (Pollack, 1997). These instruments and procedures delineate the 
agent’s room to manoeuvre as to the execution of discretionary powers. The 
institutional design of the SSM provides a number of the ECB’s ‘ex-ante’ controls over 
the NCAs which are outlined in the SSM Framework Regulation, the Supervisory 
Manual, 12  the SSM common supervisory procedures, and the NCAs’ ‘ex-ante’ 																																																								
10 Eduard Fernandez-Bollo (Chairman of the ECB’s work stream (WS2) on the SSM 
legal framework and Ignazio Angeloni (Chair of DG Macro-Prudential Policy and 
Financial Stability at the ECB) at the ECB’s Public Hearing on the SSM Framework 
Regulation, 19 February 2014, Frankfurt.  
11 Such a conclusion may be drawn after an overview of the SSM global governance 
structure in the ECB: two DGs (DG Micro I and II with around 15 Divisions for direct 
supervision of the significant banks and one DG (Micro III) with only 3 Divisions for 
indirect supervision of the less significant banks. See the organigramme of the SSM 
(ECB 2015). 
12 The ECB Supervisory Manual is an internal and partially confidential ECB/SSM 
document addressed to the NCAs, covering all the tasks and supervisory processes of 
the SSM. As such, it complements both the SSM Regulation and the future SSM 
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reporting on ‘material’ decisions and procedures — that is, decisions and procedures 
that are of supervisory interest to the ECB. The ECB’s power to issue regulations, 
guidelines and general instructions for the NCAs can be regarded as a mechanism 
situated in between the ‘ex ante’ and the ‘ex post’ controls (and is thus discussed 
below). 
 
In the SSM Regulation (Council 2013, article 6(7)), EU Member States assigned the 
ECB the obligation to establish the modalities of ECB-NCA relations — which, as 
noted above, allows us to treat the ECB as a principal. The single supervisory approach, 
which is both to precede and shape national supervisory practice, is outlined in the 
ECB’s Framework Regulation and in the Supervisory Manual. The Framework 
Regulation divides supervisory tasks within the SSM. The Supervisory Manual 
provides more specific details as to the ECB-NCAs’ non-public and confidential 
relationship in managing the supervision of less significant banks. These two 
documents set limits on the NCAs’ discretion and may be considered as the ECB’s ‘ex-
ante’ controls (procedures) on the NCAs’ supervisory policies, aimed at ensuring the 
ECB’s policy preference of reducing national divergence in supervisory approaches 
and eradicating the remaining national bias in supervisory practices. 
 
Even though the SSM regulation assigns to the ECB direct supervisory powers only 
over more significant banks, the ECB’s Framework Regulation (ECB 2014d) stipulates 
a number of specific supervisory powers which are a direct and exclusive competence 
of the ECB with regard to all banks, both significant and less significant. These powers 
are listed in Part V of the SSM Framework Regulation and described as ‘Common 
Procedures’. The SSM common supervisory procedures encompass: bank authorization 
(ECB 2014d, articles 73-79), withdrawal of bank authorizations (ECB 2014d, articles 
80-84), and assessment of the acquisition of a qualifying holding (ECB 2014d, articles 
85-87). The role of the NCAs in these procedures is limited to serving as an ‘entry 
point’, as in the case of bank authorizations, or to initiating the procedure and non-
binding consultations, as with regard to withdrawals of bank authorizations and 
assessments of the acquisitions of qualifying holdings. The SSM common supervisory 
procedures are an example of the principal’s involvement in important decision-making 
on the less significant banks and as such constitute ‘ex-ante’ controls on the agents’ 
discretion in key supervisory policies. 
 
The SSM Framework Regulation obliges the NCAs to report ex ante — or, 
exceptionally, simultaneously — on ‘material’ supervisory procedures concerning the 
less significant banks (ECB 2014d, article 97). The ECB is empowered to provide 
opinions on the draft material decisions and procedure, for example:  the removal of 
bank management board members, the appointment of a receiver (ECB 2014d, art. 97 
(2a)) and the procedures which have a ‘significant impact’ on a less significant bank 
(ECB 2014d, art. 97 (2b)). The ECB shall define the general criteria for ‘significant 
impact’, based on the risk situation of the bank and the potential impact on the domestic 
financial system. As these NCA ‘ex-ante’ reporting requirements on ‘materiality’ 
impose a burden on the execution of their discretionary powers, these requirements may 
be perceived in terms of the principal’s ‘ex-ante’ controls, which enable the ECB to 
oversee NCA actions.  																																																								
Framework Regulation and constitutes an important part of common supervisory 
acquis.  
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In addition to these procedures, in which ‘materiality’ is defined either by law or at the 
ECB’s discretion, the SSM Framework Regulation envisages another NCA ‘ex ante’ 
reporting procedure, the initialization of which is however at the NCAs’ discretion. In 
cases where a NCA finds a procedure either to be ‘material’ and thus of supervisory 
interest for the ECB (ECB 2014d, article 97) or potentially to affect negatively the 
reputation of the SSM (ECB 2014d, article 97(4b)), the NCA can notify the ECB as 
such. According to the drafters’ own interpretation, this procedure should be treated as 
a ‘catch-up’ clause for those NCA decisions which ‘do not fulfill the “materiality” 
premises, but should be assessed by the NCAs with regard to the quantitative criteria’ 
(ECB 2014c). In the context of a Principal-Agent analysis, this NCA power of initiative 
may be problematic in that it potentially generates ‘leaks’ in the principal’s control of 
its agents’ ‘zone of discretion’. The NCAs have the power to delineate the border 
between ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ procedures; that is, they can decide which 
supervisory procedures shall be of interest to the ECB and carry the burden of the ex 
ante oversight and which shall not. This issue is examined further below. 
 
According to art. 6 (5a) of the SSM Regulation (Council 2013), the ECB has a power 
to issue regulations, guidelines and general instructions to the NCAs with regard to all 
supervisory tasks carried out by them within the SSM, with the exception of the 
common supervisory procedures. From the perspective of Principal-Agent analysis, 
these instruments can be regarded as both ‘ex-ante’ and ’ex-post’ (‘hybrid’) controls 
depending on the given circumstances. The role of these ECB guidelines is principally 
to inform the NCAs how certain provisions of the supervisory acquis should be 
interpreted and applied and how the NCAs should use their discretionary powers. The 
ECB’s regulations and general instructions, in turn, are to steer the NCAs’ supervisory 
actions. For example, the Supervisory Manual, which is — in substance — a guideline 
on the supervisory policies within the SSM, could be described as an ‘ex-ante’ control. 
However, an instruction directed by the ECB to a NCA would be an example of ‘ex 
post’ control (ECB 2014d, article 108). Given the sensitivity of banking supervision 
and its potential impact on financial markets, many of the ECB’s regulations, guidelines 
and instructions directed to NCAs will be of confidential nature and are likely to be 
(only partially) disclosed after a certain period of time (Interviews, CSSF 13 , 
Luxembourg, February/March 2014).  
 
The legal status of the ECB’s regulations, guidelines and general instructions directed 
to the NCAs remains however ambiguous. In light of article 288 TFEU14 and article 34 
of the ECB Statute, in order to exercise the Union’s competences, the ECB can adopt 
legally binding regulations, directives, decisions and non-binding recommendations 
and opinions. Regulations are legally binding in their entirety as well as generally and 
directly applicable in all Member States and by its administrative bodies. Directives are 
legally binding upon Member States only and with regard to the policy result to be 
achieved, leaving to national authorities free choice as to forms and methods. Decisions 
are legally binding in their entirety, but only to those whom they address. All five of 																																																								
13 The Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) is Luxembourg’s 
national authority competent for banking supervision within the SSM.  
14 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – one of the EU constitutional 
treaties; available at http://bit.ly/P99UhB; accessed 31 March 2014. 
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the abovementioned acts are known as EU ‘typical acts’. The other decision-making 
instruments of the EU institutions not expressly listed in article 288 TFEU, are 
generally referred to as EU ‘atypical acts’ (see, for example, Snyder 1993; Cosma and 
Whish 2003; Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. 2011). The catalogue of decision-making 
atypical acts available to the EU institutions is open-ended and covers such instruments 
as inter-institutional agreements15, guidelines16 and guiding directives.17 It follows that 
the ECB’s regulations, guidelines and general instructions directed to the NCAs with 
regard to supervision of less significant banks may be seen to be equivalent to EU 
atypical acts. This issue, and particularly the problem of the enforceability of these ECB 
regulations, guidelines and general instructions, is explored further below. 
 
The ECB’s ‘ex post’ controls over the NCAs 
The principal’s ‘ex post’ controls, known also as oversight procedures, allow the 
principal to monitor its agent’s behaviour and impose sanctions in the event of ‘agency 
shirking’. These ‘ex-post’ controls are conventionally divided into ‘police patrols’ and 
‘fire-alarms’ (Kiewet and McCubbins, 1991). ‘Police patrols’ consist of an active 
surveillance of a sample of the agent’s behavior by the principal with the aim of 
detecting any of their non-compliance with the principal’s policy preferences. In a 
classic form they include public hearings, studies, field observations and examinations 
of regular agent reports (Pollack, 1997). ‘Fire alarms’ are the principal’s indirect ‘ex 
post’ controls because, while monitoring agents’ activities, the principal relies on the 
support of third parties. ‘Fire alarms’ are less costly but at the same time, they are also 
less centralized and tend to be more superficial than ‘police patrols’.  
 
ECB police patrols 
Among the ‘police patrols’, which the ECB has at its disposal to oversee NCA 
compliance with its policy preferences, three are particularly important:  the NCAs’ 
‘ex-post’ reporting requirements; the ECB’s power to request supervisory information 
from any less significant banks and to conduct general investigations and send on-site 
inspections to any less significant bank; and ultimately the ECB’s power to take over 
the supervision of the less significant bank from the NCA. ‘Police patrols’ can be 
‘intrusive’ or ‘non-intrusive’. The latter may, in turn, be tentatively divided into ‘yellow 
card’ police patrols and ‘red card’ police patrols. 
 
The NCAs’ ‘ex-post’ reporting requirements can be seen as instruments of the ECB’s 
‘non-intrusive police patrols’. Articles 99 and 100 of the SSM Framework Regulation 
(ECB 2014d) obliges the NCAs to submit regular reports on their supervisory activities 
regarding the less significant banks on the basis of which the ECB will assess the degree 
of the NCAs compliance with its policy preferences. Furthermore, the NCAs may be 
requested to provide information on their supervisory activities, both on an ad hoc or 
continual basis (Council 2013, article 6 (5e)). 
 
The ECB’s ‘intrusive police patrols’ include presenting a ‘yellow card’ to a NCA 
following its problematic supervision of a less significant bank. The section 
‘Investigatory Powers’ of Chapter Three of the SSM Regulation (Council 2013) 																																																								
15 For e.g., see TFEU art. 177, 287(3), and 295 TFEU.  
16 For e.g. see ibid. art. 121(2), 148(2), or 171(1). 
17 For e.g., see ibid. art. 218(2). 
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stipulates three procedures which can be classified as field observations (both on- and 
offsite) and can be treated as examples of ‘yellow card’ police patrols. These are: the 
ECB’s power to request supervisory information directly from less significant banks 
(Council 2013, article 10); and the ECB’s powers to carry out general investigations 
(Council 2013, article 11) and on-site inspections (Council 2013, article 12). These 
procedures are completely separate from the NCA’s ‘ex ante’ reporting on less 
significant banks. An ECB on-site inspection must notified to the concerned NCA at 
least one week prior to the notification of the less significant bank concerned (ECB 
2014d, article 145). Yet the ECB may decide that a less significant bank should not be 
informed about a planned on-site inspection if it could jeopardise the efficiency and 
proper conduct of an on-site inspection (ECB 2014d, article 145). The detailed 
procedures relating to the ECB’s on-site inspections have been further outlined in the 
Supervisory Manual but remain closed to the public.  
 
The second level of ECB ‘intrusive police patrols’ involves assigning a ‘red card’ to 
NCAs on the grounds of unacceptable performance relating to the supervision of less 
significant banks. The ‘red card’ results in direct ECB intervention into the NCAs’ zone 
of discretion, with a view to reverse and improve the outcomes of their supervisory 
policies. The SSM Regulation (Council 2013, article 6 (5b)) provides the ECB the 
power, on its own initiative,18 to take over from a NCA direct supervision of a particular 
less significant bank to ensure the consistent application of high supervisory standards 
(the ‘take-over’ clause). 
 
ECB fire alarms 
The SSM Regulation (Council 2013) assigns the ECB also possesses both ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ ‘fire-alarms’ to prevent agent shirking. The ECB’s power to relocate 
national supervisory personnel among the different NCAs participating in the SSM can 
be seen as an ‘internal’ ‘fire alarm’ in that the procedure is foreseen with the framework 
of the SSM and no external institutions are engaged. This power can also be in part 
characterized as a ‘police patrol’ control. The ECB may find it ‘appropriate’ to involve 
staff from one NCA into supervisory teams of another NCA in order to interfere with 
the direct supervision of less significant banks (Council 2013, article 31(2)). The vague 
wording of the SSM Regulation enabling clause for this ex-post control gives the ECB 
considerable margin of manoeuvre in its interpretation and application. The ECB can 
make use of this control in order to ensure that its policy preference is followed by the 
agent, allowing the ECB to avoid having to make use of more centralized ‘police 
patrols’ controls. In this case, the personnel of one SSM NCA monitors the manner in 
which another NCA carries out its supervisory tasks. The ECB thus acquires a 
decentralized source of information on possible agency shirking / slippage on the part 
of the NCAs. A caveat to treating this mechanism as a ‘fire-alarm’ stems from the fact 
that personnel from another agent (or other agents) (and not a ‘third party’ per se) 
engage in the monitoring. The SSM consists of a single principal (the ECB) but multiple 
agents (NCAs) and, in this context, it may be justified to treat national supervisory staff 
of one NCA involved in the work of another NCA as the equivalent to a ‘third party’ 
in this context. As the NCAs may compete among themselves for reputational reasons 
and for favours from their principal, it should not be assumed that NCA personnel will 
succumb to supervisory forbearance (and thus contribute to agency ‘slippage’) when 
engaged in the supervisory work of their fellow NCAs.  																																																								
18 But also upon request by a NCA (see Council 2013). 
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‘External’ ‘fire alarms’ are forms of decentralized oversight exercised by bodies that 
are external to the SSM framework (see, for example, Kiewet and McCubbins 1991). 
Two ‘external’ ‘fire alarms’ regarding the operation of NCAs can be identified. First, 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) has the power to identify breaches of EU law 
by NCAs. According to article 17 of the EBA Regulation (Council and European 
Parliament 2010), the EBA shall counteract the breaches of EU law by competent 
authorities which means that the EBA is empowered to examine the conformity of 
actions of the NCAs (and the ECB) with the SSM Regulation, the SSM Framework 
Regulation and other EU legal acts (on both hard and soft law and on supervisory or 
regulatory matters). The second main ‘external’ ‘fire alarm’ is that national parliaments 
can request public hearings on SSM supervisory policies involving personnel from both 
the ECB’s supervisory arm and the NCA concerned. On the supervision of less 
significant banks in the SSM, NCAs may be called to account by national parliaments 
in two ways. First, a NCA representative may be invited together with the Chair or 
other member of the SSM’s Supervisory Board to participate in an ‘exchange of views’ 
on supervisory policies and supervision (Council 2013, article 21 (3)). Therefore, such 
an ‘exchange of views’ may also address the supervision of less significant banks in 
various contexts. This mechanism may be useful for the ECB to assess in an ad hoc 
manner the supervisory approach of a particular NCA and its conformity with its policy 
preferences. Second, the SSM Regulation maintains national parliamentary oversight 
over NCAs, even with regard to their tasks carried out within the SSM (Council 2013, 
art. 21 (4)). This national-level ‘external’ ‘fire-alarm’, as with EBA judicial oversight 
can bring agency discretion to the attention of the ECB principal. 
 
The ECB’s struggle ahead to ensure its policy preferences  
The ECB’s mechanisms of control outlined above do not cover all the ‘zones of 
discretion’ that the NCAs enjoy when carrying out the direct supervision of less 
significant banks on behalf of the ECB. There are three major challenges to the 
maintenance of the ECB’s preferences that stem from the SSM’s current institutional 
design: the NCAs discretion on ‘materiality’ reporting (in particular the usage of the 
‘catch-up clause’); the legal status of the ECB’s regulations, guidelines and instructions 
directed to the NCAs; and the ‘proportional’ application of the SSM Regulation and the 
ECB’s Framework Regulation to the supervision of less significant banks. As noted 
above, the NCAs are required to notify ‘ex ante’ the ECB on a supervisory procedure 
which they consider to be ‘material’ and thus of potential supervisory interest to the 
ECB (ECB 2014d, article 97 (4a)) or which may negatively affect the reputation of the 
SSM (ibid., article 97 (4b)). The ECB added this provision into the Framework 
Regulation in order to enable the ECB to be informed on the major developments 
affecting less significant banks — which is clearly important in terms of ensuring the 
ECB’s policy preferences. However, NCAs retain the power to determine whether or 
not a procedure is ‘material’ and thus of potential supervisory interest to the ECB.  
 
The confidential and undisclosed regulations, supervisory guidelines and instructions 
that the ECB is empowered to adopt in relation to the NCAs (permitted under article 
288 TFEU) are commonly referred to as ‘atypical acts’. However, neither the SSM 
Regulation nor the Framework Regulation provides the ECB with direct instruments to 
enforce these regulations, guidelines and general instructions (Wymeersch 2014: 41) 
— with the important exception of the ‘take-over clause’ which might well be seen as 
the ‘nuclear option’ in the context of the SSM. Although, their legally binding nature 
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is evident, it is unlikely that confidential regulations, guidelines and instructions will 
be enforced with a direct and hard mechanism. 19  It follows, therefore, that these 
measures cannot be considered to be ‘hard law’ — that is, a legal situation where a hard 
legal obligation is followed by a hard enforcement mechanism (Terpan 2015: 13). The 
NCAs’ legal obligations are not formally accompanied by coercive mechanisms to 
ensure their enforcement. Therefore, it is prudent to consider the ECB’s confidential 
and undisclosed regulations, guidelines and general instructions as ‘soft law’ or ‘soft 
atypical acts’. In summary, the ECB lacks the power to give binding instructions (or 
equivalent acts) to NCAs regarding the supervision of specific less significant banks in 
specific cases. 
 
The principle of proportionality (article 5 of TEU) applies to the operation of the SSM. 
The drafters of the SSM Framework Regulation claimed that the less significant banks 
would have simplified reporting requirements in comparison to significant banks. Also 
the risk management standards enshrined in the supervisory acquis will be 
proportionally applied to the less significant banks (ECB 2014c). 20  Although 
proportionality may be necessary to simplify the supervision in the SSM (ibid.)21, the 
application of the principle gives the NCAs ‘margin of discretion’ and effectively 
undermines the ECB’s policy preference of consistency in supervisory approach. 
Therefore, it is crucial for the ECB to define necessary ex ante guidelines for the NCAs 
on how to interpret the common supervisory acquis. 
 
The Credibility of ECB Supervision of Significant Banks:  The Comprehensive 
Assessment  
The credibility of the SSM’s supervision of the 128 significant banks in the euro area 
depends upon the institutional design of supervision and the supervisory rules and 
procedures. Clearly, there are a number of persistent concerns as to the potential 
effectiveness of: the design of the Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs); the ability of a 
limited number of ECB supervisory staff to ensure adequate centralized control within 
the JSTs; and the precise supervisory model adopted (only part of which has been 
disclosed to the public in the Supervisory Manual). However, without the precedent of 
supranational supervision and without the hindsight of several years of operation, there 
are no objective gauges to evaluate effectively the credibility of the SSM supervision 
of significant banks. As the first important undertaking by the SSM, the ECB’s 
Comprehensive Assessment of 128 systemically important euro area banks — holding 
81.6 per cent of all euro area assets — should be examined in terms of its contribution 
to the credibility of supranational bank supervision. The Comprehensive Assessment, 
undertaken in the summer and autumn of 2014, assumed a symbolic importance as to 
the future effectiveness of the SSM.22 In this section we consider the importance of the 																																																								
19 A ‘hard enforcement mechanism’ is a legal situation in which compliance with the 
rules is ensured by judicial or (exceptionally) administrative review. For an overview 
on this matter see Terpan (2013). 
20 Jukka Vessala (Director of DG Micro III) at the ECB’s Public Hearing on the SSM 
Framework Regulation, 19 February 2014, Frankfurt; see ECB (2014c).   
21 Ignazio Angeloni (Director of DG Macro-Prudential Policy and Financial Stability 
of the ECB) at the ECB’s Public Hearing on the SSM Framework Regulation, 19 
February 2014, Frankfurt; see ECB (2014c) 
22 ‘Stakes high for Europe’s bank stress tests’, Financial Times, 22 October 2014. 
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Comprehensive Assessment and the reaction of the financial press, financial market 
operators (notably credit rating agencies) and leading financial economists. 
 
The Comprehensive Assessment consisted of the Asset Quality Review (AQR) — 
undertaken by the ECB of a total of 128 euro area headquartered banks based on data 
from the end of December 2013 — and stress tests of 123 EEA headquartered banks 
conducted by the EBA. Information gained in the former was intended to feed into the 
latter.23 Both the AQR and stress tests required banks to hold at least eight per cent of 
regulatory capital — consisting principally of equity and retained earnings — in 
relation to their risk-weighted assets under transitional Basel III / EU CRDIV rules. The 
publication of the AQR and the stress tests on the same day — 26 October — by two 
different bodies, on a different but largely overlapping sample of banks, created the 
potential for confusion (de Groen and Lannoo 2014).24 For the ECB, the AQR and 
broader Comprehensive Assessment was a matter of establishing its credibility as a 
supranational bank supervisor. For the EBA, the 2014 stress tests were a matter of 
restoring the confidence the Authority lost in the 2011 tests — widely criticized on the 
grounds that they offered a seriously inadequate assessment of the ability of European 
banks to withstand a major financial crisis (Buckley et al. 2012).25 Infamously, the 
Franco-Belgian bank Dexia had to be bailed-out in November 2012 for a third time in 
four years and less than a year after having passed the EBA’s 2011 stress tests. The 
ability of the ECB and EBA to work together in the future in a manner that reinforced 
the credibility of supranational banking supervision remained to be seen (Wymeersch 
2014).  
 
The AQR became necessary because of German government insistence that banks with 
‘legacy problems’ must not be assisted with European Stability Mechanism (ESM) bail-
out funds.26 However, even without German insistence, a review of the assets of the 
euro area’s largest banks could help — if undertaken with sufficient objective rigour 
— to bolster the credibility of the SSM and the role of the ECB as a new micro-
prudential authority. To defenders, the AQR provided unprecedented scrutiny of bank 
loan books and collateral portfolios. The AQR involved over six thousand ECB and 
NCA officials, reviewing eight hundred portfolios, amounting to more than 57 per cent 
of the risk-weighted assets of the 128 banks examined. The ECB also stated that 
officials examined 119,000 borrowers, valued 170,000 items of collateral, build 765 
models to challenge banks’ own estimates of risk-weighted assets (ECB 2014e: 19).27 
It provided a great deal of data that supervisors and private bank analysts could closely 
examine. Crucially, the AQR significantly improved the transparency and 
comparability of bank data across the eighteen euro area Member States and Lithuania 
(to join at the start 2015). The AQR manual (ECB 2014b), published on 11 March, 																																																								
23 De Groen and Lannoo (2014) examine the relationship between the ECB’s AQR and 
the EBA’s stress tests of largely overlapping but slightly different groups. See also 
‘ECB says bank asset reviews will feed into stress tests’, Financial Times, 8 August 
2014. 
24 De Groen and Lannoo (2014) show that only 103 banks were subject to both the AQR 
and the stress tests. Twenty banks were subject to the stress bank, while twenty-seven 
banks were subject to the AQR and not the stress tests. 
25 Financial Times, 27 October 2014. 
26 EUObserver, 3 December 2012. 
27 ‘ECB says banks overvalued assets by €48bn’. Financial Times, 26 October 2014. 
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included the first set of bank supervision guidelines ever produced for, specifically, 
euro area NCAs — which were considerably more detailed and directing than existing 
EBA guidelines. The manual contains methodology for the AQR’s ‘phase 2’ (the on-
site inspection of banks) with detailed guidance on a range of matters including: 
procedures for validating data and checking model inputs; the valuation of material 
exposures and collateral and determine provisioning needs; the processes for quality 
assurance and progress tracking to ensure timely completion; when to use independent, 
external valuations for assets; and the use of industry benchmarks to assess market 
values. The AQR harmonized the definition of non-performing loans and uncovered 
hidden losses. In doing so, the ECB found massive shortfalls — €136 billion — in the 
loans that banks and national regulators classified as non-performing (bad). This figure 
amounted to fifteen per cent increase of the total announced by NCAs. The ECB found 
that banks had over-valued their assets by a total of €48 billion, pointing especially to 
an over-valuation of commercial loans.28  
 
The success of the EBA’s 2014 stress tests can be evaluated by three measures.29 The 
first was sufficient transparency and comparability in the results. In 2014, there were 
to be twelve thousand data points on the different scenarios (benchmark and adverse) 
and the EBA made use of AQR definitions. Earlier in the year, the EBA announced that 
for the first time it would publish fully loaded common equity tier one ratios for each 
bank — whereas some market participants had previously refused to disclose these 
figures themselves. Second, rigorous tests could boost confidence in the capital position 
of European banks.30 The 2014 stress tests lowered Tier 1 capital by, on average, four 
points — even more than US Federal Reserve tests (2.9 per cent drop for participating 
banks in 2014). Both the ECB president, Mario Draghi, and the head of the SSM, 
Danièle Nouy, argued publicly that some banks would have to fail the stress tests in 
order to ensure the credibility of the new system.31 Indeed, the number of banks failing 
in the adverse scenario of the 2014 stress tests far exceeded the results of previous tests. 
Twenty-four banks failed with a capital shortfall under the adverse scenario of €24.6 
billion. Another sixteen institutions, including seven in Germany, were left with capital 
ratios between 5.5 per cent to 7 per cent. After capital raising in 2014, fourteen banks 
still failed the tests, with a shortfall of €9.5 billion under the adverse scenario, 
representing four per cent of total bank assets. While more rigorous that all previous 
EBA stress tests, the 2014 shortfall was lower than most expectations.32  
 
																																																								
28 ‘ECB says banks overvalued assets by €48bn’. Financial Times, 26 October 2014. 
29 This list is based in part on: ‘Stakes high for Europe’s bank stress tests’, Financial 
Times, 22 October 2014. 
30 Rigorous stress tests that build investor confidence could also help to lower the 
banks’ cost of funding. In 2014, Italian banks paid on average 1.1 per cent more deposit 
than German banks. 
31 ‘Draghi Builds Stress-Test Credibility in ECB Bank Review’. Bloomberg Business, 
12 December 2014; available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-
12/draghi-builds-stress-test-credibility-as-ecb-readies-bank-review; ‘Transcript of 
interview with Danièle Nouy’. Financial Times, 9 February 2014. 
32 ‘Analysts comb the data for clues to banks’ health’. Financial Times, 26 October 
2014; ‘Bank shares lose early gains after ECB stress tests’. Financial Times, 27 
October, 2014. 
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Third, and most importantly, the tests were expected to encourage capital-raising and 
facilitate bank restructuring. Banks were given just two weeks to present plans to the 
ECB following the 26 October publication date and up to a further six to nine months 
to raise capital to cover shortfalls on the baseline and adverse scenarios respectively.33 
In part, the credibility of the Comprehensive Assessment on this measure was felt prior 
to the announcement of the November results. A range of larger euro area banks 
actively engaged in raising capital levels to avoid having to take corrective action later 
in the year. Principally, banks issued equity. 34  However, they also publicly listed 
subsidiaries; deleveraged by selling portfolios of assets; and sold businesses. Described 
as the ‘announcement effect’, when some banks raised capital this increased market 
pressure on other banks to improve their capital positions, regardless the schedule set 
out in Basel III and the EU’s capital requirements directive (CRDIV).35 These pressures 
paralleled a fortuitous improvement in investor demand for bank equity in 2014 — 
which made failing the stress tests even less acceptable to management and investors.36 
For its part, the ECB actively encouraged banks to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions to issue equity.37 In late October, the ECB estimated that banks had raised 
€57.1 billion from the start of the year (ECB 2014e).38 To take but one major example, 
Deutsche Bank raised 8.5 billion with a June equity issue to prepare itself for the AQR. 
However, a full assessment of this measure of credibility could be detected only 
following a period of significant writedowns — effectively a further clean-up — in the 
months following the November results.  
 
The twenty-five (fourteen after earlier capital raising in 2014) named banks that failed 
the Comprehensive Assessment were largely expected.39 Nonetheless, after a brief rise, 
bank shares indexes dropped significantly.40 Most bank analysts expected slow growth 
in bank lending as a large number of institutions would continue to boost their capital 
positions. 41  Thus, the principal overarching objective of the Comprehensive 
Assessment — to build stable banking sectors that contribute to economic growth — 
was, at best, to be attained in medium term.42 Italian and Greek banks were the most 
exposed, with respectively nine and four failing, followed by three Austrian banks and 
two from each of Cyprus, Slovenia, and Spain. Italian banks were responsible for a 
quarter of the total over-valued assets, just less than one per cent of their risk-weighted 
assets. Greek banks were responsible for €7.6 billion of the total over-valued assets, or 
almost 4 per cent of their risk-weighted assets. Once capital injections in early 2014 																																																								
33 ‘ECB to give two-week deadline for banks to plan for shortfalls’. Financial Times, 
17 July 2014. BdB, the German banking association, criticized the two-week deadline 
for being too short. 
34 ‘EU banks binge on capital to avoid stress test failure’. Financial Times, 6 May 2014. 
35 ‘European banks raise capital ahead of stress tests’. Financial Times, 3 July 2014. 
36 ‘European banks raise capital ahead of stress tests’. Financial Times, 3 July 2014. 
37 ‘EU banks urged to grasp chance to raise capital’. Financial Times, 24 April 2014. 
38 ‘Analysts comb the data for clues to banks’ health’. Financial Times, 26 October 
2014. 
39 For a detailed analysis of the results of the Comprehensive Assessment, see ‘LEX 
review European banks after the AQR’. Financial Times, 27 October 2014. 
40 ‘Bank shares lose early gains after ECB stress tests’. Financial Times, 27 October, 
2014. 
41 Ibid.. 
42 ‘Bank stress tests fail to tackle deflation spectre’. Financial Times, 27 October, 2014. 
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were taken into account, four Italian banks still faced shortfalls including the country’s 
third and fourth largest institutions: the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) and Banco 
Popolare. MPS, which needed to cover a shortfall of €2.1 billion,43 was the largest 
failure of the Comprehensive Assessment. Only one German bank failed — Münchener 
Hypothekenbank — but it had raised sufficient capital in 2014 to avoid additional 
capital action. German banks would have to lower the value of their assets by €6.7 
billion while French banks would only have to do so by €5.6 billion. 
 
Italian banks were hit particularly hard by the harmonized definition of non-performing 
loans. In 2014, bad loans totalled €160 billion — more than double their level in 2010 
— and they were expected to rise to nearly €1200 billion in 2015.44 About seventeen 
per cent of Italian bank loans — €333 billion — were nonperforming, according to the 
International Monetary Fund. 45  The Italian government responded to the 
comprehensive assessment by considering the possibility to set up a bad bank — that 
is, a vehicle designed to absorb some of the non-performing loans of the banking sector 
— as established previously in Spain (the SAREB). 46  Banks hoped that the 
establishment of a bad bank would allow them to sell their bad loans at higher prices.47 
 
Despite the widespread vote of confidence for the Comprehensive Assessment from a 
range of credible sources,48 there were also critical voices of both the AQR and stress 
tests and the methodologies used and there were calls for more work to be done to make 
them more rigorous (de Groen 2014).49 The ECB calculations on the basis of risk-
weighted assets — which rely on the banks’ own assessments of risk-weights assigned 
to assets and the assessment of credit rating agencies — were criticized. Despite 
improvement over previous stress tests, transparency was deemed to be inadequate with 
only a limited disclosure of banks’ own funds and liability structure (de Groen 2014). 
The tests ignored massive litigation costs facing banks.50 They ignored the tighter 
definition of capital to be imposed from 2019 which would deduct items such as 
goodwill and certain tax assets. Including this definition would, according to a Goldman 
Sachs study and the EBA’s own figures, have quadrupled the actual capital shortfall of 
European banks and doubled the number of banks failing — including four large 
																																																								
43 The Economist, 26 October 2014. ‘MPS vulnerability exposed by ECB’. Financial 
Times, 26 October 2014. 
44 Reuters, 3 December 2014. 
45  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1524.pdf. New York Times, 13 
February 2015. 
46 New York Times, 13 February 2015. 
47Ibid. 
48 ‘Better way to check the health of Europe’s banks’. Financial Times (27 October 
2014). The Financial Times praises the assessment, while noting its flaws, and calls for 
the repetition of AQR on an annual basis. 
49 See, for example, Finance Watch (2014). See also ‘Post-crisis journey of rebuilding 
confidence in Europe’s banks’. Financial Times, 3 November 2014; ‘European Stress-
Test Results Have Isolated Errors, Inconsistencies’. Wall Street Journal, 27 October 
2014. The strong position of German banks — including publicly owned Landesbanks 
— also attracted considerable scepticism. See ‘German banks surprise after stress tests’. 
Financial Times, 26 October 2014. 
50 ‘Bank stress tests fail to tackle deflation spectre’. Financial Times, 27 October, 2014. 
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German banks. 51  Market expectations had already taken on board this reinforced 
definition. With the Bank of England announcing a new leverage ratio standard at the 
end of October,52 many bank analysts called for the EBA stress tests also to include the 
overall level of bank borrowing. A team at the Stern School of Business at New York 
University led by the economist Viral Acharya had developed an alternative 
methodology — SRISK which takes into account the banks’ total balance sheet without 
regard for risk (Acharya and Steffen 2014). 53  Applying SRISK found a range of 
European banks to suffer from worse shortfalls in an adverse scenario. French banks 
— which the EBA found had no shortfalls in an adverse situation54 — were found to 
have shortfalls of €189 billion in the Stern School tests, far worse than the larger 
German and UK banking systems.  
 
Conclusion 
This contribution has discussed the main milestones in the establishment of the SSM in 
2014, leading up to 4 November when the mechanism became operational. It has 
examined SSM credibility in terms of the mechanism’s design and specifically the 
relationship between the ECB and NCAs within the SSM with the objective of 
consistent euro area supervision. It has been argued that the principal-agent relation 
between the ECB and the NCAs is likely to contribute to NCA slippage in the 
supervision of less significant banks, because ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ controls are not 
costless measures. Hence there is a trade-off between higher agency costs against 
limiting of the ‘agency loss’. This contribution has also examined SSM credibility in 
terms of the effectiveness of the ECB’s direct supervision of significant banks. In its 
Comprehensive Assessment of significant banks, the ECB has demonstrated its 
capacity to make difficult supervisory decisions, as evidenced by the AQR that revealed 
the poor state of several banks in the euro area, with Italy having the most troubled 
banks. 
There is an interesting parallel between the quest for credibility in the establishment of 
the ECB / Eurosystem and that concerning the setting up of the SSM. In the first case, 
the quest for institutional credibility was triggered by the transfer of monetary policy 
from the national level to the supranational (euro area) level. In the second, this search 
for credibility was motivated by the transfer of banking supervision from the national 
to the supranational level (the euro area / BU level). The main institutional difference 
between these two processes of delegation is that whereas, in the case of monetary 
integration, the transfer was complete (that is, there was no monetary sovereignty left 
at the national level) in the SSM the transfer was partly incomplete because the 
supervision of less significant banks remained principally at the national level, leaving 
some room for agent shirking. This contribution has focused on the credibility of the 
institutional design of the SSM and it first major assessment of the solidity of the euro 
area’s banks, which are the only assessments possible at this stage. The credibility of 
																																																								
51 ‘Bank stress tests fail to tackle deflation spectre’. Financial Times, 27 October, 2014. 
‘Analysts comb the data for clues to banks’ health’. Financial Times, 26 October 2014. 
52 ‘Bank stress tests fail to tackle deflation spectre’. Financial Times, 27 October, 2014. 
53 ‘Alternative stress tests find French banks are weakest in Europe’. Financial Times, 
27 October 2014. 
54 ‘ECB results show ‘solidity’ of French banks, says government’. Financial Times, 
26 October 2014. 
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the SSM will be determined by its empirical track record. 
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